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AN UNCLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCHERS

Center for the Study
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Preface

This is the first edition of an annotated, unclassified bibliography designed for researchers on intelligence processes and functions and produced by the Center for the Study of Intelligence in OTR. It was developed primarily for internal use in the Center but is being given wider distribution in the belief that it may also be of use to a variety of other CIA elements.

An effort has been made to list materials of interest on the processes of collection as well as production, although only a sampling of the extensive, anecdotal "spy" literature of intelligence has been included. It will be readily apparent that the available unclassified literature useful for serious intelligence research is still very spotty.

Copies of most of the papers and articles listed in the bibliography are available in the Center.

Additional entries suggested by users for a future, expanded edition are welcome and can be addressed to the Director of Studies, CSI/OTR.

Agee, Philip. Inside the Company: CIA Diary. Ontario, Canada: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1975. 640 pp.

Agee tells of his career as a junior and middle-level case officer in Quito, Montevideo, and Mexico City, and his subsequent disaffection with the Agency and U.S. policies. His stated purpose is to get "useful information on the CIA to revolutionary organizations that could use it." The "diary" has been embellished with Agee's views of the historical, political, and economic contexts of his operations as he has come to view them since leaving the Agency.

Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. 338 pp.

Allison presents three models for understanding government behavior: Rational Actor, Organizational Process, and Bureaucratic Politics. He describes the logic of each model, then applies the model to the Cuban missile crisis. The study includes information on the role of intelligence during the crisis and is useful in studying the process of intelligence support for policy-making.

Alsop, Stewart. The Center: People and Power in Political Washington. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 365 pp.

In Chapter 8 (pp. 213-252), "CIA: Triumph of the Prudent Professionals," Alsop gives a personal view of many top intelligence officers and their roles in Agency activities. Individuals he writes about include Thomas Karamessines, Frank Wisner, Richard Bissell and his role in the development of the U-2, and Richard Helms.

Andregg, Charles H. Management Of Defense Intelligence: National Security Management. Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1968. 52 pp.

A short, primarily descriptive study of the origins of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Barzun, Jacques and Graff, Henry F. The Modern Researcher. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957. 386 pp.

Still one of the more useful aids around; worth a scan by any serious intelligence researcher before he sets out on his study.

Behrman, Jack N., Boddewyn, J. J., and Kapoor, Ashok. Effects of U.S. International Companies on Intergovernmental Relations. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1974. 442 pp.

A study of the interaction among U.S. manufacturing businesses abroad, host governments, and U.S. Embassies to determine the impact on the formation of U.S. foreign policy. The study, commissioned by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, focuses on patterns of communications among the three groups and means for their improvement. In Chapter III the author analyzes the problems and opportunities in developing and using intelligence networks within and outside the international companies. This corporate intelligence generally deals with risks and opportunities for business abroad, which affect company policy formation and implementation.

Blackstock, Paul W. The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. 351 pp.

Although ten years old, this volume takes on new meaning in the light of the attention focused on CIA's covert action function. The author, with some intelligence experience, but now a college professor, reviews not only the common CA episodes usually contained in volumes of this kind, but also includes a good deal of reflective material on the implications as he sees them of CA operations. A research study of CA or of any intelligence collection function would need to include this volume as one of its starting points.

Blum, Richard H., ed. Surveillance and Espionage in a Free Society, A Report by the Planning Group on Intelligence and Security to the Policy Council of the Democratic National Committee. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. 319 pp.

This is by far the best collection to date of articles on the myriad aspects of the role of intelligence, domestic and foreign, in our society. Most of the articles, which range through discussions of the FBI and police intelligence to the CIA and policy support, are written by those at least mildly critical of the CIA and interested in change. Any researcher dealing with the larger issues concerning the role of intelligence in our government and policy could start with this volume.

Borosage, Robert L. and Marks, John. The CIA File. New York: Grossman/Viking, 1976. 236 pp.

This book is primarily a compilation of the record of a meeting held in Washington, D.C., in September 1974 which was devoted to airing objections to CIA's involvement in Covert Activities. It includes the speech to the group by then CIA Director William Colby and the question and answer period which followed that speech. The book has chapters (speeches) by the most prominent of the critics of CIA, both responsible and irresponsible. It duplicates entirely the feature section of Society magazine, Volume 12, Number 3, entitled "Espionage USA," March/April 1975, which in turn is a slightly edited down treatment of each of the speeches at the session. The book provides a full catalog of the sins of which the CIA is accused.

Bryan, George S. The Spy in America. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943. 256 pp.

The history of American intelligence from the Revolutionary War until the end of the First World War.

Canada. Report of Royal Commission to Investigate Disclosures of Secret and Confidential Information to Unauthorized Persons. Ottawa: Cloutier, 1946. 733 pp.

One of the few official accounts in the public realm of the operation of a Soviet spy net. Useful for researchers on espionage operations and comparative intelligence.

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission), "Intelligence Activities," A Report to the Congress (containing the Commission and Clark Task Force Reports), June 1955.

Clark, Keith C., and Legere, Laurence J., eds. The President and the Management of National Security. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. 274 pp.

Most of the studies of the overall management of the national security process have been produced by various executive and congressional commissions. This volume has the virtue of being a non-governmental report designed to resume the organizational history of the process since WW II, pose and grapple with the major conceptual issues in the process and evaluate various alternatives for changed organization which would lead to an improvement of the process. The authors are all experienced government hands and their observations reflect numerous interviews with government officials. A researcher considering any of the issues involved in how intelligence is used in the national security process could get a good basic sense of the user side through a review of this volume.

Copeland, Miles. The Real Spy World. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974. 351 p.

A journalistic, anecdotal perspective and defense of espionage, counterespionage, and covert action as conducted by the CIA. The writer is a former Agency officer who was present at the creation. Researchers working on case histories involving specific episodes of Agency activities would wish to check this volume for assistance.

Copeland, Miles. Without Cloak or Dagger. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. 351 pp.

The book is interesting and readable, explaining the basics of espionage operations, agent handling, and the operation of a CIA field station. Copeland writes about the Agency in a favorable way, defending it against recent exposés. For a professional intelligence researcher, the volume would be useful as a storehouse of lore and anecdotes on the espionage side of the business.

Cottam, Richard W. Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. 243 pp.

The author's main thesis is that American foreign policy lacks adequate long-range planning and is outdated in terms of its ability to conduct needed "interference" in the affairs of others in order to influence short and long-term outcomes. The author's "interference" is the CIA's "covert action," and this book is a must for any researcher seeking to explore the theory and philosophy that could or should underpin covert action. The author would give CIA a policy-making role in order to better rationalize the conduct of covert action by our government.

Dallin, David J. Soviet Espionage. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1955. 558 pp.

A leading authority on Soviet Russia discusses in detail the Soviet espionage system, its evolution, its theory, and its operational code. The book contains certain "area studies" of Soviet espionage, particularly Europe and North America. This is one of the most comprehensive and authoritative studies of the subject.

Daugherty, William E., and Janowitz, Morris. A Psychological Warfare Casebook. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 880 pp.

A comprehensive treatise on the subject. One chapter relates intelligence research and analysis to psychological warfare, with a series of case studies of POW interrogations showing how they provide the basis for psy war materials.

de Rivera, Joseph, and Rosenau, James N., consultant. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968. 441 pp.

This study is unique as an attempt by a trained psychologist to unravel the behavioral dynamics of the individual that underlie the process of foreign policy. The first several chapters study the way individuals perceive and react to information they receive; later chapters discuss individual motives in decision-making and the psychological factors of group action in foreign policy. A researcher studying any intelligence process would find nourishment for his research in this volume. It is a must for the study of intelligence support for foreign policy.

Dorsen, Norman, and Gillers, Stephen. None of Your Business: Government Secrecy in America. New York: The Viking Press, 1974. 362 pp.

A useful background volume on secrecy in intelligence operations. It is a collection of papers read before a 1973 conference on secrecy in government, plus some of the follow-on discussion of the papers. The authors and participants cover the political spectrum. The general tone is critical of the CIA and other centers of government secrecy, but there is some useful marshalling of issues and some nuggets of thought here and there.

Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: The New American Library, 1963. 256 pp.

A key book for all intelligence researchers. It offers a wide-ranging view of the perceptions on intelligence by one of the Agency's founding fathers and, as such, covers much of the history and variety in intelligence through the 1950s.

Dulles, Allen. Great True Spy Stories. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 393 pp.

An anthology of stories presenting "a comprehensive view of the business of clandestine intelligence as it has been practiced during the present historical era." The 39 stories are divided into 11 categories such as networks, double agents, etc., with comments on each by Mr. Dulles. Recommended.

Dvornik, Francis. Origins of Intelligence Services. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974. 334 pp.

This book describes the early intelligence services of the Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, China, and Muscovy. The author points out that efficient and dependable intelligence services were a necessity for all the major empires and describes the use of secret police, counterintelligence, fast communications, road networks, postal systems, and other devices which contributed to their success. The book is easy to read and would be of interest to the general reader. Although it focuses on early times, it might be marginally useful to a researcher working on questions which involve comparative intelligence.

Falk, Stanley L. National Security Management: The National Security Structure. Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1967. 166 pp.

A descriptive aggregation of the various government entities that make up the national security apparatus. There is a short, descriptive section on the Intelligence Community. A student seeking a basic review of the national security process would find the book useful. Solid bibliography.

Farago, Ladislas. War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1954. 379 pp.

Typical of the many popularized, anecdotal accounts of intelligence and espionage in World War II and after. Interesting because of the author's effort to develop an organizational philosophy for intelligence.

Ford, Corey, Donovan of OSS. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. 366 pp.

A "biography of the late William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan, and the history of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which he conceived and directed in World War II." It is based on interviews with one of Donovan's brothers, his wife, associates, and personal papers of Donovan. Appendices contain copies of some of the documents relating to the OSS. Useful for those working on intelligence history.

Franck, Thomas M., and Weisband, Edward, eds. Secrecy and Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 453 pp.

This volume is worth a scan, but not much more, by researchers working on a wide range of topics. As a compendium on the subject of secrecy in government, it illustrates that many authors have done a little thinking about a variety of sub-elements of the problem, but that a central, carefully organized approach is apparently still lacking. Those seeking some comparison of U.S. intelligence and that of foreign governments will find help here in several articles, as will those studying Congress and secrecy. A section on the public media and secrecy in government mainly covers familiar ground. A final section on the individual vs. the state on the matter of secrecy is largely a series of personal vignettes by aggrieved parties in the liberal spectrum such as Daniel Ellsberg's lawyer.

Godfrey, E. Drexel, and Harris, Don R. Basic Elements of Intelligence: A Manual of Theory, Structure and Procedures for Use by Law Enforcement Agencies Against Organized Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (Technical Assistance Division, Office of Criminal Justice Assistance, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice), November 1971. 150 pp.

Good, basic, comprehensive works on the processes of collection and production of foreign intelligence are still rather rare. Even rarer are basic efforts to define and describe the intelligence process as it should and does exist in other areas such as the corporate and business world. This volume provides the first comprehensive effort to lay out the intelligence process in the field of law enforcement against crime. It was produced by authors thoroughly familiar with the Intelligence Community of the U.S. government and would be of considerable use to any researcher working in the field of comparative intelligence. The authors attempt to apply many of the techniques of the foreign intelligence process to police work.

Goulden, Joseph C. Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair--Illusion and Reality. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969. 285 pp.

This journalistic study of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin affair, although highly critical of the Government decisions and actions associated with it, is nonetheless useful to researchers on questions of intelligence analysis and the intelligence-policy interface. It is one of the few published works that attempts a description in detail of the intelligence interaction with policy and policy execution in an important foreign incident.

Green, J. R. The First Sixty Years of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Diss. The American University, 1963. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc. 138 pp.

The author intended this book to serve as a reference for unclassified presentations on Naval Intelligence. He has done an admirable job of filling the many gaps in material previously available on this subject. He describes ONI in considerable detail from its creation, and he elaborates on its effectiveness in specific incidents such as the Spanish-American war, Pearl Harbor, and the Battle of Midway. The book is almost entirely factual with little opinion or analysis.

Gross, Bertram M. ed. Social Intelligence for America's Future: Explorations in Societal Problems. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969. 541 pp.

This volume would have a marginal interest for anyone working in the field of intelligence theory. It is a wide ranging analysis of intelligence as information and its use in measuring domestic social conditions in the U.S. in the 70's and 80's. Although there is no direct application to the foreign intelligence business, the volume does show that others are thinking about the problems of organizing information for policy support in a variety of diverse fields. Several chapters contain thoughts on possible methodologies for the collection of social intelligence.

Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970. 421 pp.

The theory that political violence in a group is a function of the relative deprivation of that group has received wide attention from scholarly researchers in the past few years. This volume represents one of the as yet few attempts to bring the carefully structured thinking of systems dynamics and other new methodologies to bear on political phenomena in a fully rounded way. Gurr's volume is worth the attention of analysts and others studying how to improve the intelligence analysis product.

Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974. 340 pp.

Another entry in the growing decision-theory literature by an author with considerable experience inside the national security apparatus. Using the ABM decision and various other case histories, Halperin studies the interest groups that participate in and influence the foreign policy process. There is a mine of anecdotal information in this volume and a host of intriguing insights. A must volume for anyone interested in the relationships between information and decision-making.

Halperin, Morton H., and Kanter, Arnold, eds. Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973. 434 pp.

A collection of articles on the decision-making process in government. Several deal critically with the role of intelligence in policy support. Others offer a look at the anatomy of several important decisions, although they do not deal explicitly with the role of intelligence in those decisions.

Hamilton, Peter. Espionage and Subversion in an Industrial Society: An Examination and Philosophy of Defence for Management. London: Hutchinson, 1967. 230 pp.

This is one of the few studies permitting a comparison of foreign intelligence operations with another field of intelligence, in this case industrial espionage. It concentrates on English industry, but is very scholarly, conceptual, and well organized in laying out the uses, scope and defenses against industrial intelligence. Useful for a researcher in areas of comparative intelligence.

Haswell, Jock. British Military Intelligence. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973. 262 pp.

Haswell, a retired army major, did not hold intelligence assignments while on active duty. After retiring he was employed at the British School of Service Intelligence as a writer. The book is of more interest and use to the general reader than to professional intelligence officers. It contains anecdotes of British military intelligence operations up through the first World War.

Head, Richard G. and Rokke, Ervin J., eds. American Defense Policy. 3rd ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 696 pp.

All researchers on matters of decision making in the national security establishment owe a debt to their military colleagues at the Air Force Academy for this extensive compendium of articles and commentary on myriad aspects of American foreign policy. Only a scattering of the material bears directly on intelligence, but it is still worth a look by intelligence researchers.

Hilsman, Roger. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956. 187 pp.

A unique, valuable book that attempts to compare attitudes toward intelligence among those that produce it and those who use it. Its uniqueness comes partly from its "inside" quality, since it is the narrative account of many interviews with users and producers. The author also compares some academic approaches to intelligence with reality in the business and attempts to construct an ideal, rational doctrine of intelligence support to policy. For anyone with a professional interest in intelligence and a desire to be well-read on the subject, this now 20-year-old volume is a must. Much of it still describes the state of affairs in the business of intelligence and policy.

Hilsman, Roger. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 198 pp.

An unexceptional treatment of the various government power centers and their interplay in the policy formulation process. A section on the CIA is interesting for its thoughtful explanation of the "power" of the Agency.

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1967. 602 pp.

Essentially a personal memoir and view of the main crises of the Kennedy years. As such it adds little that is unique to the record. There is a chapter on the place of intelligence in a free society that sketches in the pros and cons of covert operations and contains some suggestions for limited, careful reforms of the Agency.

House Committee on Armed Services. "Amending the Central Intelligence Act of 1949," Report, August 11, 1966, to accompany H.R. 16306, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1966.

Hymoff, Edward. The OSS in World War II: The Complete Story of America's First Wartime Espionage Service, the Forerunner of the CIA. New York: Ballantine Books, 1972. 405 pp.

Rather than a "complete story," this book is a collection of incomplete stories of various OSS activities, with emphasis on the human element. The book lacks organization, but the individual chapters are done reasonably well.

Ind, Colonel Allison. A Short History of Espionage. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963. 337 pp.

A chronological review of the history of espionage, illustrative of the numerous rather shallow, generalized accounts of the subject.

Jackson, Henry M., ed. The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 311 pp.

This volume contains selected documents and testimony before Congress in connection with the Jackson Committee's inquiry into the National Security Council system in 1960. Many of the problems of decision mechanisms, executive control, and information flow still within the system are illustrated in this volume. As such, it provides a helpful bench mark for intelligence process studies that include consideration of the policy-making apparatus for foreign affairs.

Janis, Irving L. Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1972. 277 pp.

Janis presents his explanation of why foreign policy decision makers who are individually wise, able, informed, and dedicated sometimes do and sometimes do not make wise decisions. He deals primarily with the pressures for consensus and gives examples of it in six situations: the Bay of Pigs, U.S. operations in North Korea, Pearl Harbor, Vietnam, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the formulation of the Marshall Plan. A researcher on almost any intelligence process that deals with personal interaction should review this volume.

Jeffers, H. Paul. The CIA: A Close Look at the Central Intelligence Agency. New York: The Lion Press, 1970. 159 pp.

A superficial volume of little value to any serious research purpose.

Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 1164 pp.

The most authoritative book on communications intelligence.

Kaufman, Herbert. The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960, 1967. 259 pp.

A study of the behavioral dynamics of a large organization, in some ways comparable to the CIA in its central and field elements. It provides interesting grist for the intelligence researcher in that it constitutes a useful, relevant study based on sound sociological techniques but written in a style understandable by the layman.

Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. 226 pp.

A pioneering attempt by one of the giants of predictive intelligence to lay out an operational doctrine for the effective writing of intelligence estimates. A must for researchers on any intelligence production process.

Kim, Young Hum. The Central Intelligence Agency: Problems of Secrecy in a Democracy. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1968. 113 pp.

A collection of articles now somewhat out of date, but by prominent authors, on a variety of issues much in the news today. Deals with the establishment of CIA, its functions and performance, and the need for supervision and control of the Agency. Overall, the book is critical of the Agency.

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. The Real CIA. New York: MacMillan, 1968. 312 pp.

The author uses his wealth of knowledge gained from personal experience in the middle and top management of the CIA to describe the Agency and its role. Anecdotes based on his experience in intelligence give the public an insider's view of the Agency and its role in such events as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the U-2 incident. A scholarly book with many documentary references. Valuable because of his view of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the Agency.

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities. New York: Hill and Wang, 1973. 212 pp.

The author draws on his personal experience in the CIA for this authoritative book on the development and functioning of the Intelligence Community. It covers the period 1947-1973 and describes the impact of intelligence on policy-making in the White House. A good book for the general reader; well documented.

Klass, Philip J. Secret Sentries in Space. New York: Random House, 1971. 236 pp.

Klass tells "the story of the U.S. and Soviet reconnaissance-satellite programs, and their impact on world affairs." The author, senior avionics editor for Aviation Week & Space Technology, researched the subject well and has provided a reasonably good introduction to the topic.

Leighton, Alexander H. Human Relations in a Changing World. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1949. 354 pp.

This is the story of an effort by OWI personnel to assess Japanese morale during WW II. It represents one of the earliest attempts to explore the nature of analytical support to policy-making, and the extent to which the social sciences might be brought to bear in such an effort. Those interested in the analytical process in intelligence, as well as those studying intelligence methodology, would find it worth review.

MacCloskey, Monro. The American Intelligence Community. New York: Richards Rosen Press, Inc., 1967. 190 pp.

A short, superficial resumé of the American intelligence establishment circa 1967.

Marchetti, Victor, and Marks, John D. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. 398 pp.

Marchetti, a former CIA employee and Marks, formerly employed by the intelligence division of the State Department, present a critical view of the CIA, particularly its covert operations. They advocate for the Agency a role limited to "overall supervision, coordination, and processing of intelligence." The book was printed with certain portions deleted as a result of CIA objections.

McGarvey, Patrick J. CIA: The Myth and the Madness. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972. 240 pp.

This is one of the maverick volumes about the Agency written by a former employee whose main experience was on the analytical side of the house. Subsequently he did a tour with DIA. Anyone interested in the psychological attitudes of Agency employees, or in an insider's approach to some of the general criticisms leveled against the CIA, would find it useful to review McGarvey's volume, keeping in mind that its factual accuracy has been repeatedly questioned.

McGovern, William Montgomery. Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961. 191 pp.

Another in the set of volumes authored during the initial years of the U.S. central intelligence apparatus and intended to develop a philosophy and concept for the production of strategic intelligence. Using voluminous anecdotes from World War II, the author shows the significance of secret, economic, "ethnological and ideological" information in producing national intelligence. Researchers on intelligence production functions should probably review it for a flavor of the early scholarly work on intelligence.

Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. 302 pp.

This book deals with the personalities, issues, and events in the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between Moscow and Washington. A first-stage agreement was signed in May 1972. Scattered throughout the book are references to the Central Intelligence Agency and its role in verifying that the Soviet Union is living up to the terms of the agreement.

North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R., Zaninovich, N. George, and Zinnes, Dina A. Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963. 182 pp.

An early effort to explore quantitative methodologies in the analysis of international relations. At the heart of this approach is the weighting of words and phrases used by nations in their dealings. Worth a scan by a researcher on intelligence analysis.

Orlov, Alexander. Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1963. 187 pp.

Although nearly 15 years old, and concerned with the situation in the 1930's, this is one of the better reviews of Soviet intelligence, primarily general operational doctrine. The author's advantages are: his former good position in Soviet intelligence; time after leaving it to reflect on it; and some understanding of the American concept of intelligence. One of the more interesting elements of the book is the author's explicit and implicit comparison of U.S. and Soviet intelligence services.

OSS Assessment Staff. Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1948. 541 pp.

A description of the OSS psychological and other procedures for choosing personnel. Very carefully structured and organized, it would be useful for research on the selection of intelligence personnel.

Pettee, George S. The Future of American Secret Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. 120 pp.

This is a short book about the various processes of intelligence, from collection through production, as the author saw them working from the vantage of a military intelligence officer in World War II. It grapples with the problems inherent in these processes that the author believed would influence the development of a post-war American intelligence apparatus. Since the intelligence process has evolved far beyond the author's viewpoint, the book is now of little more than historical interest.

Platt, Washington. National Character in Action: Intelligence Factors in Foreign Relations. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961. 250 pp.

Platt discusses the importance for the intelligence collector and analyst of understanding the character traits of groups. Unfortunately, he does not relate his group character concepts directly to real problems of intelligence analysis. Thus, the book is only of marginal interest to students of analysis and other intelligence processing problems.

Platt, Washington. Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. 302 pp.

A pioneer effort to define doctrine and principles for the production of national-level intelligence. Much of it will strike today's reader as artificial and out of date; yet, there are still useful insights to researchers on the intelligence production process.

Prouty, L. Fletcher. The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control of the United States and the World. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1973. 496 pp.

A highly inaccurate attack on the CIA, of no use for serious research.

Ransom, Harry Howe. Can American Democracy Survive Cold War? Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963. 270 pp.

Two chapters of this book are about the CIA and include a generally objective assessment of its early coordination problems with the Department of Defense; the difficulties in producing good predictive intelligence; and the appropriate place of covert action and espionage in a democracy. Some useful background and quotations from early Congressional hearings on intelligence.

Ransom, Harry Howe. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970. 309 pp.

Ransom, Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, has revised and updated his earlier book, Central Intelligence and National Security. It is a scholarly work, based on open sources. Unfortunately, even this revision is now out of date in terms of recent Congressional and public criticism of the CIA. Nevertheless, Ransom covers many of the basic intelligence issues in our society in relation to: the CIA, the Intelligence Community, Congressional surveillance of CIA, and the intelligence bureaucracy and its problems. He also has a chapter on the British intelligence system and its influence on the American system. Since this is one of the more thorough and objective books about the Agency, it would be useful for Agency researchers who want an informed outsider's view of the Agency and the Intelligence Community.

Report of the Royal Commission on Security. (Abridged). Ottawa, Canada: The Queen's Printer, 1969. 159 pp.

This work is worth a look by those interested in the relationship between intelligence and security. Essentially a commission study on how Canada is organized to protect her official secrets, it contains some thoughtful material on the whole general problem of proper secrecy in government and society. Assumptions are stated and there is some interesting philosophy on how members of another free society see their security and secrecy issues.

Rothstein, Robert L. Planning, Prediction, and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs: Theory and Practice. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. 215 pp.

This significant book really consists of two studies. One is an innovative and insightful description of what is needed to produce useful planning in the foreign affairs environment and, by inference, in the foreign intelligence field. The other is an examination of how theory can be made useful to the everyday practitioner of the various foreign affairs arts. Researchers on Agency management, intelligence support of policy, and the development of theory and doctrine in intelligence would find this volume must reading.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973. 505 pp.

This book deals with the shift in the constitutional balance between Congress and the Presidency. Of particular interest to those in the field of intelligence is Chapter 10, "The Secrecy System," in which Schlesinger traces secrecy in government from the Constitutional Convention to the release of the Pentagon Papers. He favors less secrecy but acknowledges it will still be up to Congress to accept its responsibility for being informed.

Schwien, Edwin Eugene. Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission. Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, Inc., 1936. 125 pp.

An old, but still illuminating, examination of the tactical military consumer's intelligence needs.

Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, "National Defense Establishment," 80th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 758, 3 parts. Washington, D.C., 1947.

Part 3 contains testimony on central intelligence.

Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Intelligence and National Security, Report, 86th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1960.

Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to the Secretary of the Navy, "Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security" (Eberstadt Report), 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, pp. 12-13, 159-163.

Brief account of World War II intelligence organization and Navy proposals for postwar reorganization.

Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Report, "Joint Committee on Central Intelligence Agency," Senate Report No. 1570, 84th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, D.C., February 23, 1956.

The Committee supports, by an eight-to-one vote, the proposal to establish a Joint Congressional Committee on CIA. Contains the outlines of the argument in favor of such a move as well as the dissenting argument.

Senate Judiciary Internal Security Subcommittee, Hearing, "Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments," 83rd Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C., June 25, 1953, Part 13.

Contains testimony and important documents and memoranda relating to intelligence organization within the Department of State, 1945-1947. See especially pages 854-882.

Sheehan, Neil. The Pentagon Papers. New York: The New York Times Company, 1971. 677 pp.

The "Pentagon Papers" cover the role of the United States in Indochina from World War II to May 1968, and consists of approximately 3,000 pages of narrative history and more than 4,000 pages of appended documents. They were commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in June 1967 and completed in January 1969. The Pentagon Papers indicate that the CIA and other intelligence units were generally accurate in their reporting of the situation in Vietnam. They have been widely used and quoted by many scholars and journalists researching and writing on the Intelligence Community.

Smith, Richard Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1972. 458 pp.

The book covers the field activities of OSS but omits almost completely activities at the Washington headquarters. It is based on unclassified sources, including interviews with a number of OSS alumni.

Smith, Thomas Bell. The Essential CIA. Self-published, 1975. 204 pp.

This pro-CIA book is about the author's experiences in the Agency from 1952-1963. He worked in the DDP, in the Technical Services Staff, and as a case officer. Of marginal use to someone studying the early history of the Agency.

Strong, Sir Kenneth (Major-General). Intelligence at the Top. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969. 271 pp.

A rather rambling discussion by a very thoughtful, experienced intelligence practitioner of his military career with special emphasis on his activities during World War II as Chief of Intelligence for Home Forces. Although primarily biographic in format, the work provides useful insights into the processes used by the Allies to assess German intentions and gives an interesting picture of intelligence collection in its early stages. Useful for researchers on the history of intelligence and comparative intelligence services.

Strong, Sir Kenneth (Major General). Men of Intelligence. New York: A Giniger Book published in association with St. Martin's Press, 1971. 183 pp.

The only extant work in the public realm which offers some comparison of the philosophies and experiences of major intelligence chiefs through John McCone. The author's material on the American leaders is interesting because of his British perspective. There is some comparison of American and British intelligence systems--a subject not yet explored anywhere in detail, and an interesting philosophical chapter on the general role of intelligence and the intelligence officer. A basic book for those interested in the literature of intelligence.

Taylor, John W. R., and Mondey, David. Spies in the Sky. New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1973. 128 pp.

Presents the role of reconnaissance in war and peace, beginning with the 18th Century. The information on the U-2 adds little that is new and contains some inaccuracies. Aerial surveillance in the Cuban missile crisis and satellite programs are also covered.

Tully, Andrew. CIA: The Inside Story. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962. 276 pp.

Another of the early popularized accounts of the CIA of little use to serious intelligence research.

Tully, Andrew. The Super Spies. New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1969. 256 pp.

So far, only journalistic, anecdotal accounts of NSA are extant. This one is of little use to the serious researcher.

U.S. Bureau of the Budget. Report: Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government. 20 September 1945. 23 pp.

This Report discusses and proposes a plan for the organization of U.S. foreign intelligence and security activities following World War II. It cites the need for a more widespread understanding of what intelligence is, and calls for separation of security intelligence (counterintelligence) operations from the more basic intelligence operations. The Bureau of the Budget urges creation of strong departmental organizations with leadership of Government-wide intelligence activities to be centered in the State Department. The Report would be of interest to anyone studying the background of the Central Intelligence Agency and considering functional or organizational changes in the Agency.

U.S. Congress, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on Nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence. 93rd Congress, First Session, July 2, 20, and 25, 1973. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973. 186 pp.

Considerable discussion of a number of main issues and topics in American intelligence today.

U.S. Department of State. Intelligence: A Bibliography of Its Functions, Methods, and Techniques, Part I. Bibliography No. 33, December 20, 1948. 91 pp. Part II (Periodical and Newspaper Articles), Bibliography No. 33.1, April 11, 1949. 60 pp.

Part I contains publications in English or Western European languages since 1900, with a few outstanding works published earlier.

Part II covers the same time period, with entries in four groups:

- I. Organizational Structure; Functions
- II. Methods and Techniques
- III. Spies and Espionage
- IV. List of Newspaper and Periodical Articles On Intelligence

U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 20 November 1975. 349 pp.

This interim report of the Committee's investigation covers questions of U.S. involvement in assassination plots against foreign political leaders, whether the U.S. was involved in other killings, authorization, and communication and control. Alleged U.S. involvement in assassination plots in Cuba, Zaire, Dominican Republic, Chile, and South Vietnam were investigated. Would be of interest to anyone studying investigations of CIA.

Vagts, Alfred. The Military Attaché. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 408 pp.

A thoroughly documented history of military attachés, with most of the author's sources preceding 1960. Shows the conflicts faced by attachés as a result of civilian-military relationships.

Whaley, Barton, Codeword BARBAROSSA. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1973. 376 pp.

BARBAROSSA was the name given by Hitler to his plan to crush Russia. In this book covering the 11-month period preceding Germany's attack on Russia on 22 June 1941, Whaley presents his explanation of how and why Stalin and all the intelligence services of the world were caught by surprise. Interesting in its illustration of the interweaving of various influences--intelligence, press, personality quirk, and happenstance--on the process of policy formulation.

Whaley, Barton. Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T., Center for International Studies, 1969. 965 pp.

A very extensive compilation of case histories, based largely on secondary sources and U.S. military records. Of marginal interest to researchers looking at post-mortem methodology or perhaps covert action.

Wilensky, Harold L. Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967. 226 pp.

One of the few studies of the intelligence function by a behavioral scientist, Wilensky's work is especially valuable for its examination of factors which affect the quality and accessibility of intelligence information in organizations. It touches on foreign intelligence work within the U.S. Government, as well as intelligence needed for domestic policy and business decisions. Written between 1963 and 1966, it is limited by the lack of access to the extensive material on CIA and U.S. foreign intelligence disclosed in the seventies. The work has a number of highlights including the intelligence "failure" case study of the "Great Salad Oil Scandal." Extensive bibliography.

Williams, David. Not in the Public Interest: The Problem of Security in Democracy. London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1965. 224 pp.

A look, from the British point of view, at the operation of the Official Secrets Act. Useful to researchers on comparative intelligence and on the question of intelligence secrecy and the public right to know.

Wise, David, and Ross, Thomas B. The Espionage Establishment. New York: Random House, 1967. 308 pp.

Although the authors discuss the intelligence services of the U.S., Great Britain, USSR, and China, the CIA is their main concern. They see the secret power of the Intelligence Community as a threat to freedom. They present more information on the British intelligence and security services than had been available publicly up to that time. Their coverage of the Soviet intelligence system is done well, but the section on Chinese Communist intelligence is lacking.

Wise, David, and Ross, Thomas B. The Invisible Government. New York: Random House, 1964. 375 pp.

Wise and Ross say that the Central Intelligence Agency is at the heart of an invisible government which is shaping the lives of Americans. They give a detailed account of the Bay of Pigs invasion, discuss the National Security Act of 1947 and the early history of the CIA, describe the role of CIA in Vietnam and Guatemala, and include brief chapters on the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. 426 pp.

A classic analysis of the problem of failure in intelligence warning. A useful reading for any researcher on processes of intelligence production and analysis if only to illustrate the complexity of the process and the difficulties in achieving analytic objectivity.

Wriston, Henry Merritt. Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations. Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1967. (Copyright, 1929, by The Johns Hopkins Press.) 874 pp.

A fascinating excursion through the history of executive and congressional use of extra-constitutional agents in foreign affairs. Although published in 1929, it has considerable relevance today in such issues as the proper scope of covert operations and executive responsibility for providing intelligence and information on intelligence activities to Congress.

Yost, Charles W. The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs. New York: Random House, 1972. 234 pp.

Contains a good, short statement of the traditional State Department position against the CIA. The author calls for a smaller intelligence apparatus, with State taking the lead role in reporting and analysis.

Zacharias, Ellis M. Behind Closed Doors: The Secret History of the Cold War. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1950. 367 pp.

Illustrative of the many journalistic, anecdotal accounts of intelligence developments during the cold war era by an author experienced in wartime intelligence. Illustrates the expectations of this period for the uses of counter-intelligence and covert action.

Zlotnick, Jack. National Intelligence: The Economics of National Security. Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1964. 75 pp.

A short history and description of the development of the national intelligence apparatus through the 1950s. Rather basic, somewhat outdated, and of limited use in any but a general educational mode.

Brown, R. V., Kelly, C. W., Stewart, R. R., and Ulvila, J. W. The Timeliness of NATO Response to an Impending Warsaw Pact Attack: A Decision-Theoretic Approach to its Analysis and Estimation. McLean, Virginia: Decisions and Designs, Incorporated, August 1974. 75 pp.

One of the few efforts in unclassified literature to apply new methodologies to a specific problem in intelligence analysis.

Brown, T. A. Desirable Ways of Displaying Uncertainty to Decisionmakers. Paper prepared for A. W. Marshall, National Security Council. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 4 May 1973. 12 pp.

A short description of the advantages of expressing probabilities in analysis. The author advocates the use of explicit probabilities and describes six ways of expressing a probability mathematically. He also points out some pitfalls for the analyst to avoid in presenting statements to decisionmakers.

Brown, Thomas A. An Experiment in Probabilistic Forecasting. RAND Report prepared for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, R-944-ARPA. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, July 1973. 45 pp.

This report describes an experiment conducted by the RAND Corporation to determine ways of increasing the usefulness of forecasts by groups and individuals by having them stated in explicit probabilistic terms. The experiment is relevant to the question of "how the intelligence community can more effectively communicate degrees of uncertainty to decisionmakers."

Chan, Steve. A Program-Budgeting Proposal for Foreign Intelligence. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, Harold Scott Quigley Center of International Studies, n.d. 43 pp.

This paper presents a budgeting and accounting system for foreign intelligence operations by a graduate student without any direct experience in the intelligence business. Useful only to illustrate how a total outsider sees the overall intelligence process.

Chwat, John Steven. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: An Historical and Contemporary Analysis (1955-1975). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 13 November 1975. 33 pp.

Summary of the membership and some of the main issues in connection with PFIAB done from unclassified sources.

Clauser, Jerome K., and Carter, Elton S. The Design of an Intelligence Discipline: Assessment of Intelligence Educational and Training Requirements. State College, Pennsylvania: HRB-Singer, Inc., March 1965. 55 pp.

This, the initial section of a planned three-part study of an intelligence discipline, attempted to ascertain the types of skills and knowledge needed by individuals holding various jobs from analysts through managers in the intelligence analysis and publication cycle. The authors' findings provide a useful cumulation of such skills, and the study would be handy for research on intelligence training.

Dulles, Allen W. "Memorandum Respecting...Central Intelligence Agency....," submitted to Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 25, 1947. Printed in Hearings, National Defense Establishment, "80th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 758, Washington, D.C., 1947, pp. 525-528.

A concise statement of Mr. Dulles' views on a central intelligence organization as of 1947.

Evans, Gary Lee. The United States Intelligence Community: A Brief Description of Organization and Functions. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 10 November 1971. 36 pp.

Would be useful for someone who wants a quick overview of the Intelligence Community as it was organized in 1971. Also contains a short history of intelligence in the United States.

Graham, Daniel O. U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads.
USSI Report 76-1. Washington, DC: United States
Strategic Institute, 1976. 17 pp.

In this paper, written shortly after his retirement from the position of Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, General Graham seeks to put into perspective the issues of actual and alleged shortcomings and abuses of the intelligence agencies. He points out the damage caused by decline in morale, breakdown in bureaucratic discipline, and the loss of essential secrecy. He presents his ideas for legislative, organizational, and procedural reforms to correct shortcomings in the intelligence system. Would be of interest to anyone studying the investigations and proposed reorganization of the Agency.

Greenwood, Ted. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control. Adelphi Papers, Number 88. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972. 28 pp.

This short monograph is one of the few nonclassified efforts to assess the capabilities of photographic and other satellites.

Knorr, Klaus. Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences, Research Monograph No. 17. Princeton: Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1 June 1964. 58 pp.
(This paper was published originally under the title, "The Intelligence Function," in Social Science Research and National Security, by Ithiel de Sola Pool and Others, A Report Prepared by the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences of the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., March 5, 1963.)

A long monograph, now somewhat outdated, examining the relationship between the social sciences and intelligence analysis. The author calls for the development of intelligence theory and doctrine shaped to demonstrate the ways social science can be useful.

Ocque, Nancy D. The Directors of Central Intelligence.
13 June 1975. 38 pp.

A term paper for a foreign affairs course at Johns Hopkins. Based on unclassified sources, the paper brings together information about the men who have served as Director of Central Intelligence.

Ransom, Harry Howe. Strategic Intelligence. Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1973. 20 pp.

A short basic outline, intended for the lay reader, of the elements which make up the process of strategic intelligence. The author also includes suggestions for research on the intelligence process, many of which are pertinent to today's concerns.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight. Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation (Memorandum RM-4328-ISA), April 1965, 41 pp.
Also appeared in Foreign Affairs, July 1965, pp. 691-707.

An excellent analysis of the classic intelligence problem of warning posed by the Cuban missile crisis and the Pearl Harbor attack. Must reading for any student of analytic or intelligence production processes.

Baldwin, Hanson W. (five-article series in The New York Times on Intelligence):
July 20, 1948, "One of Weakest Links in Our Security, Survey Shows--Omissions, Duplications"
July 22, 1948, "Older Agencies Resent a Successor and Try to Restrict Scope of Action"
July 23, 1948, "Errors in Collecting Data Held Exceeded by Evaluation Weakness"
July 24, 1948, "Competent Personnel Held Key to Success--Reforms Suggested"
July 25, 1948, "Broader Control Set-Up is Held Need, With a 'Watch-Dog' Unit for Congress"

A series of five articles on intelligence dealing mainly with the Central Intelligence Agency. Reports on the first "investigative survey of the whole intelligence structure of Government" by Allen Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa in 1948. Describes friction between CIA, FBI, G-2, AEC, and State. Points out "intelligence fiascos" and weakness in evaluation of data, personnel problems, and the need for greater control by means of a Congressional "watch-dog" committee. Of interest in showing intelligence concerns a quarter century ago.

Barnds, William J. "Intelligence and Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a Democracy." Foreign Affairs, January 1969, pp. 281-295.

A thoughtful examination of the evolution of the CIA. A good general article for anyone dealing with the role of intelligence agencies in a democracy.

Bell, Daniel. "Twelve Modes of Prediction--A Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social Sciences." Daedalus, Summer 1964, pp. 845-880.

Useful short review of predictive methods in the political area. Beginning researchers faced with formulating the approach methodology for their study would find this article worthy of a look.

Blackstock, Paul W. "Covert Military Operations." Handbook of Military Institutions. Ed. Roger W. Little. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971. pp. 455-492.

Scholarly treatments of covert action are rare. This relatively general piece traces the rationale of governments for CA from the cold war days through the revolutionary nationalist period and discusses the various types and objectives of CA.

Blackstock, Paul W. "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration." Armed Forces and Society. February 1975, pp. 231-250.

One of the few short, non-journalistic reviews of the course of CIA affairs since the 1971 order from President Nixon on the reorganization of the Intelligence Community. Emphasizes resource allocation problems facing the Intelligence Community.

Bruce, David K. E. "The National Intelligence Authority." Virginia Quarterly Review, Summer 1946, pp. 355-369.

This well-written article would be of interest to those studying the history of intelligence services in the United States. Includes information on the establishment of the Coordinator of Information, General Donovan's leadership of COI, and the problems faced by the organization. The controversy over the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority and the difficulties anticipated for it are discussed.

Cline, Ray S. "Policy Without Intelligence." Foreign Policy, No. 17, Winter 1974-75, pp. 121-135.

The author, who was the State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research from 1969-1973, urges a return to the effective use of the National Security Council and other elements of the "foreign policy and intelligence bureaucracy" in decisionmaking. He criticizes the Kissinger-Nixon practice of "secret deliberations at the top" and contrasts what he considers to be the misuse of the National Security Council in the U.S. military alert on 24 October 1973 with the effective "close collaboration between intelligence and the NSC" during the Cuban missile crisis.

Cooper, Chester L. "The CIA and Decision-Making," Foreign Affairs, January 1972, pp. 223-236.

A former officer of ONE discusses the process of preparing national intelligence estimates under the old Board system and describes the values and faults of some specific estimates, particularly on Vietnam.

"Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities," Directive from the President. Department of State Bulletin, 3 February 1946, pp. 174-175.

Directive from the President setting up the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group and stating the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.

de Sola Pool, Ithiel. "Content Analysis for Intelligence Purposes." World Politics, April 1960, pp. 473-485.

An interesting review of a RAND study dealing with Allied analysis of German intentions during World War II, using FBIS broadcasts and propaganda analysis. The author makes several good points in presenting a case for content analysis as a tool for identifying trends in the policies of other nations.

Donovan, William J. "Intelligence: Key to Defense." Life, 30 September 1946, pp. 108-120.

This article was written by William J. Donovan after the OSS was disbanded. He cites the need for effective intelligence by our Government and points out the weaknesses of the system at the time. He states the precepts of intelligence which he says are being violated. Also included are examples of the work of OSS during World War II. Of historical interest.

Evans, Allan. "Intelligence and Policy Formation." World Politics, October 1959, pp. 84-91.

A review with comment and interpretation of three basic books on intelligence. The author's views are now largely outdated, but of marginal interest to the researcher on the intelligence-policy interface.

Evans, John W. "Research and Intelligence: The Part They Play in Foreign Policy." Foreign Service Journal, March 1957, pp. 24-25, 34, 40.

Historical information on State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Falk, Richard A. "CIA Covert Action and International Law." Society, March/April 1975, pp. 39-44.

An emotional attack on covert action based on its alleged illegality in international law. Of marginal use to a study of intelligence and its legal relationships.

Falk, Stanley L. "The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy." Political Science Quarterly, September 1964, pp. 403-434.

Would be of interest to anyone studying the role of the National Security Council (NSC). Points out the effect of the personality and individual desires of the President on the role and scope of the NSC. Describes President Truman's emphasis on the advisory role of the NSC; its reorganization and formal structure under President Eisenhower; and President Kennedy's reorganization of the NSC with a combination of features from the two previous systems.

Fallows, James. "Putting Wisdom Back into Intelligence." Washington Monthly, June 1973, pp. 6-17.

A critical look at the Agency's analytic effort as well as clandestine operations. Mostly a rehash of commentary and insights from other authors.

Futterman, Stanley N., "Toward Legislative Control of the C.I.A." New York University Journal of International Law & Politics, Winter 1971, pp. 431-458.

The author, an Associate Professor of Law at New York University, calls for legislation to restrict the CIA, particularly its use of funds. He describes the laws which set up the CIA and some of the bills before the Congress (in 1971) aimed at more strict control of the Agency. He also discusses the Agency's relationship with Congress through the four oversight subcommittees and expresses his doubt about their exercise of control over the Agency. While out of date, this article may be of interest in studying the past relationship of Congress and the CIA.

Graham, Daniel O. "Strategic Intelligence: Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job." Army, April 1973, pp. 14-18.

Written by Maj. General Graham while he was Deputy Director for Estimates in DIA, this article presents his case for giving the military profession the responsibility for intelligence estimates, as well as collection, regarding the threat to our national security. He discusses strategic and tactical intelligence, describing them in a way that he says is different from their traditional definitions. Would be of interest to researchers on Intelligence Community issues and coordination processes.

Greene, Fred. "The Intelligence Arm: The Cuban Missile Crisis." Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues and the Instruments. Eds. Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. pp. 127-140.

Fred Greene, Professor of Political Science at Williams College, writes about intelligence as "a special arm within the realm of American foreign policy in recent decades." The Cuban missile crisis is used as an illustration of the role of intelligence in the formation of policy. He discusses the philosophic precepts, and the bureaucratic structure of the Intelligence Community, and concludes that "though the Intelligence Community was surprised at the start, it handled the situation fairly well."

Halperin, Morton H. "Decision-Making for Covert Operations." Society, March/April 1975, pp. 45-51.

An essay on the advantages the intelligence establishment has in securing administration approval for covert action. Stresses the lack of independent cross-checks built into the system. A fuller exposition along the same lines is contained in Halperin's book on Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Useful for researchers on any aspect of the interface between intelligence production and consumption.

Hammond, Paul Y. "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal." American Political Science Review, December 1960, pp. 899-910.

An excellent examination of the National Security Council (NSC) as a means of coordinated policy guidance. Covers the historical background of the NSC and its functioning under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. Problems in the operation of the NSC, and possible ways of making the process work better, are discussed.

Hilsman, Roger, Jr. "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs." World Politics, October 1952, pp. 1-45.

Of interest to anyone studying the intelligence interface to policy-making. Hilsman concludes that intelligence, to be useful, must be policy oriented. Discusses the differences between intelligence people and policy-making people and includes a section on the warning function of intelligence.

"Intelligence Objectives." Department of State Bulletin, 12 May 1946, pp. 826-828.

Of interest to anyone studying the history of intelligence in the Department of State. Lists the functions of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence; Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison; Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination; and the Geographic Offices.

Jervis, Robert. "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1968), pp. 454-479.
(Also included in Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective, edited by Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973, pp. 113-138.)

An interesting examination of the mental and psychological processes of policy makers in receiving and taking account of incoming information, including intelligence. Of utility to researchers on the intelligence support and intelligence production processes.

Johnson, Robert H. "The National Security Council: The Relevance of its Past to its Future." Orbis, Fall 1969, pp. 709-735.

The author examines the kinds of functions the NSC has performed during the four previous administrations and the kinds of functions it could perform. He stresses the difficulty in generalizing about how foreign and defense policies are made and points out that the NSC is only one part of a complex system. Useful for research on intelligence and intelligence-related organizations.

Jones, R. V. "Scientific Intelligence." Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, August 1947, pp. 352-369.

A personal interpretation, anecdotal in nature, of some of the major occurrences in British scientific intelligence in World War II. The author, who worked in the field, is concerned with the organizational problems inherent in producing good scientific intelligence.

Kendall, Willmoore. "The Function of Intelligence." World Politics, July 1949, pp. 542-552.

A review of Sherman Kent's book, Strategic Intelligence. Its value lies in the questions Kendall raises concerning the role of strategic intelligence, many of which still have some validity today.

Kent, Sherman. "Estimates and Influence." Foreign Service Journal, April 1969, pp. 16-18; 45.

An essay by the father of the estimative business on the concepts of developing national estimates and the attitudes of policy makers toward estimates. The conclusions are still largely valid.

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. "Paramilitary Case Study, The Bay of Pigs." Naval War College Review, November-December 1972, pp. 32-42.

An analysis by a former CIA Inspector General of the lessons for the Intelligence Community in the conduct of covert operations. Criticizes the failure of the analytic side of CIA to be included in the evaluation of the operation.

Knorr, Klaus. "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles." World Politics, April 1964, pp. 455-467.

A very penetrating examination of the difficulties faced in intelligence analysis when dealing with the subject of intentions. Knorr suggests several areas where useful work could be done in developing intelligence theory and doctrine.

Lay, James S. "The National Security Council." American Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3 (March 1948), pp. 7-8.

The author was serving as the first Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security Council when this article was written. It would be of interest to anyone looking at the early organization and work of the National Security Council from an intelligence perspective.

Lefever, Ernest W. "The CIA and American Foreign Policy." Lugano Review, Volume 4, 1975, pp. 1-34.

An effort to justify covert action on moral and constitutional grounds.

Lewis, Anthony Marc. "The Blind Spot of U.S. Foreign Intelligence." Journal of Communication, Winter 1976, pp. 44-55.

A solid presentation of the argument that intelligence analysis and analysts, to be accurate and useful, must make a greater effort to understand the cultural dynamics and psychology of their subject countries.

Lockhart, John Bruce. "The Relationship Between Secret Services and Government in a Modern State." R.U.S.I., June 1974, pp. 3-8.

A short, concise description of eight "principles" which should govern the operational objectives of any intelligence service, in an address delivered by an experienced British intelligence professional. Useful in terms of broad philosophy for intelligence services operating in a democratic environment.

Loory, Stuart H. "The CIA's Use of the Press: A 'Mighty Wurlitzer.'" Columbia Journalism Review. September/October 1974, pp. 9-18.

The most extensive commentary so far in the public media on CIA employment of journalists in clandestine operations.

Maxwell, Elliot E. "The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution." The Yale Law Journal, January 1975, pp. 608-636.

A scholarly effort to prove that the secrecy surrounding the CIA budget is illegal under Article I of the Constitution: that a regular accounting shall be made of all monies drawn from the U.S. Treasury. Useful to a researcher on Agency relations with Congress.

Millikan, Max F. "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action." The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences. Ed. Daniel Lerner. New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959. pp. 158-180.

A rather good discussion of the problems in attempting to apply social science to the solution of policy issues. Describes differences in the way social scientists and policy makers view research and the results they expect from it. There are many parallels with intelligence support for policy-making. Also discusses briefly the interdisciplinary approach to research in the social sciences.

Morris, Roger. "The Aftermath of CIA Intervention." Society, March/April 1975, pp. 76-80.

A good statement of the case against covert action based on humanistic perceptions and idealistic morality.

Murphy, Charles J. V. "Uncloaking the CIA." Fortune, June 1975, pp. 88-91 ff.

A general description of the Agency, basically favorable to it. Contains good statements of most of the main arguments used in defense of various CIA activities.

New York Times (five-article series on the CIA):

April 25, 1966, "CIA: Maker of Policy, or Tool?"

April 26, 1966, "How CIA Put 'Instant Air Force' into Congo"

April 27, 1966, "CIA Spies From 100 Miles Up: Satellite Probes Secrets of Soviet"

April 28, 1966, "CIA Operations: A Plot Scuttled"

April 29, 1966, "The CIA: Qualities of Director Viewed as Chief Rein on Agency"

Best newspaper account of Agency in the 1960s.

Pinkerton, Roy H. "The Role of Intelligence in Policymaking." Military Review, July 1966, pp. 40-51.

Illustrative of the generally shallow interpretations of this relationship available in public accounts.

Ransom, Harry Howe. "Great Britain's Secret, Secret Service." Midway, June 1967, pp. 19-35.

The author gives general information about the British secret service and its success in remaining a "secret" service. He contrasts it with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and suggests some ways he thinks the U.S. could profit by following the British example. Would be of interest to anyone studying (1) the problem of secrecy in a democracy or (2) the British secret service itself.

Ransom, Harry Howe. "Intelligence, Political and Military," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol 7. New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, pp. 415-421.

A short, tight general survey of intelligence history and modern functions. It stresses definitions, basic literature, and makes suggestions for further social science research.

Ransom, Harry Howe. "Secret Intelligence Agencies and Congress." Society, March/April 1975, pp. 33-38.

A short description of the origins and development of CIA relationships with Congress offered in the usual balanced Ransom style. Useful only as a general review.

Ransom, Harry Howe. "Secret Mission in an Open Society." The New York Times Magazine, 21 May 1961, pp. 20, 77-79.

Written during the investigation of CIA following the "Bay of Pigs" when "troublesome issues" were "raised not only about the efficiency of the C.I.A. but about its role in American democratic society." Points out the means designed to control the CIA--Federal statutes, NSC directives, PFIAB, and Congressional subcommittees, and emphasizes the need to keep the Agency under firm, responsible, political authority.

Ransom, Harry Howe. "The U.S. Congress and American Secret Intelligence Agencies." Prepared for delivery at the 1974 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois, August 29 - September 2, 1974, 32 pp.

A review of the development and status of the Congressional review of intelligence which concludes that Congress needs more information if it is to exercise a meaningful role in foreign policy-making. Also reviews legislative intent in the establishment of the Agency.

Roberts, Kenneth E. "Lessons of Strategic Surprise: Pearl Harbor, Cuba and the 1973 Middle East Crisis." New Dynamics in National Strategy: The Paradox of Power. Foreword by General Maxwell D. Taylor with contributions by faculty members of the United States Army War College. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1975. pp. 69-89.

This is a short essay on the problem of the intelligence analysis of seemingly irrational national behavior. The author draws a number of conclusions about the type of analysis needed from studying Pearl Harbor, Cuba, and the 1973 Middle East Crisis. Students of the problem of strategic surprise would find his views pertinent.

Rositzke, Harry. "America's Secret Operations: A Perspective." Foreign Affairs, January 1975, pp. 334-351.

Makes a case for an oft-suggested solution to CIA clandestine operations: separate covert from analytic CIA functions and put the covert operators directly under the executive in deep cover. One of the more ingenious efforts to develop this approach. By a former CIA officer.

Ruggles, Richard, and Brodie, Henry. "An Empirical Approach to Economic Intelligence in World War II." Journal of the American Statistical Association, March 1947, pp. 72-91.

This article describes the work of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in London, beginning in 1943. Markings and serial numbers from captured German equipment were used to estimate Germany's war production and strength. After the war, the estimates were compared with official statistics which became available, and the estimates were shown to be highly accurate. The article goes into great detail on the methodology of the estimates. Of historical interest in studying intelligence methodologies.

Schneier, Edward. "The Intelligence of Congress: Information and Public Policy Patterns." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1970, pp. 14-24.

A perceptive article on how Congressmen get the information on which they base their decisions. Useful for anyone thinking about CIA's relationship to Congress.

Scoville, Herbert, Jr. "The Technology of Surveillance." Society, March/April 1975, pp. 58-63.

A very general rundown on what is in the public domain on the new technological processes of intelligence collection and analysis. Contains a badly stretched argument in favor of substituting technology for human operations.

Szanton, Peter and Allison, Graham. "Intelligence: Seizing the Opportunity," Foreign Policy, Spring 1976, pp. 183-214.

The authors urge taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the events of the past two years to "rethink and restructure the U.S. 'intelligence community'." Six proposals are made for reorganization and new procedures. New legislation and effective oversight by Congress are also called for. Comments on the article by George A. Carver, Jr. and Morton H. Halperin present two different reactions to the suggestions in the main article..

Taylor, Rufus L. "Command and the Intelligence Process." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1960. pp. 27-39.

A careful parsing of the various processes involved in the production of military intelligence from the Navy's perspective. This article is of interest in its historical perspective on the attitude of the military toward intelligence.

Unna, Warren. "CIA: Who Watches the Watchman?" Harper's Magazine, April 1958, pp. 46-53.

Another article which called for more effective Congressional oversight of the CIA. Cites bills which have been introduced (but not passed) for this purpose. Discusses Allen Dulles' relationship with Congress. Would be of general interest to someone looking at the history of CIA's relationship with Congress.

Vagts, Alfred. "Diplomacy, Military Intelligence, and Espionage." Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations. New York: King's Crown Press, 1956, pp. 61-77.

Discusses military intelligence and diplomacy beginning in the 1600s through the "Cold War." There is a brief section on the establishment of the CIA and some of the questions that have been raised regarding its competency, particularly during the Korean War.

Walden, Jerrold L. "The C.I.A.: A Study in the Arrogation of Administrative Powers." George Washington Law Review, October 1970, pp. 66-101.

Short, general review of the origins and authorities of the CIA, emphasizing the shortcomings in the law and control mechanisms for the Agency.

Wasserman, Benno. "The Failure of Intelligence Prediction." Political Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1960, pp. 156-169.

An academic, theoretical exposition on intelligence, now largely outdated by modern intelligence procedures, but of some interest to researchers on intelligence theory.

Wilensky, Harold L. "Intelligence in Industry: The Uses and Abuses of Experts." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1970, pp. 46-58.

Some very general remarks about how industries cope with several basic problems of information needs, especially at the corporate headquarters. Most of it is a reflection of Wilensky's larger, basic work: Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry.

Wright, Quincy. "Subversive Intervention." American Journal of International Law, July 1960, pp. 521-535.

An early essay on the conflict of international law and covert operations.

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Some Thoughts on the Value of a Study of
Compartmentation in the CIA

A prime objective of the Center is to keep as much of its work as possible focused on issues at the core of professional life in the CIA. We believe that a study of the various impacts of compartmentation in the Agency would fall within this area. We have in mind a study of compartmentation that would range well beyond and indeed would be primarily concerned with other than the necessary, usual security aspects of the subject. If carefully defined, focused and researched, we believe a study of compartmentation could provide some useful insights on a range of perennial issues in the Agency. Depending on the exact focus of the study, we would hope to get some of the following:

- A better sense of whether our general lack of personnel rotation between offices and components in the Agency is really hurting us.
- A clearer understanding of how the continuing trend toward greater professional specialization is affecting overall Agency performance.
- Some measure of how well the formal structures, coordinating mechanisms, etc., we have set up to overcome certain acknowledged impacts of compartmentation have functioned.

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- Some additional insights into the question of personnel effectiveness insofar as the presence or lack of adequate communication between components impacts on such effectiveness.
- A better sense of the extent to which the free flow of ideas, so important to the early strength and vitality of the Agency is continuing.
- A better idea as to whether needed security precautions which form the rationale for compartmentation in many instances are being effectively served by present organizational arrangements or are even being observed.
- An understanding of how our compartmentation, impact stacks up against similar phenomena in other government agencies and possibly in private business.
- A grasp as to how compartmentation impacts on the "central" features of a central intelligence system.

Obviously the research required to deal seriously with each of the elements above would call for a study probably too diffuse to be useful. We believe that a careful effort

at defining the problem could, however, result in the necessary refinement of the approach and focus so as to concentrate on a reasonable number of relevant and rational objectives.

A main key to success in all the Center's projects is selection of the proper people to do them. If a project of this type is to be thorough enough to be useful, it will almost certainly take a team approach. No one individual could bring to it the experience and breadth to do the job in a reasonable length of time (6-9 months). We will need three to four people with one functioning as a team leader. The latter individual will be most important. He must be fairly senior, so as to provide some credibility and entree in various Agency circles. He must have a wide breadth of job experience so as to provide a good understanding overall of the organization and functioning of the Agency. An officer from the DDA with a view of many Agency elements from the support side might be the best bet.

There are a number of officers at the GS-14-15 level in the DDA with interests that go well beyond their immediate job horizons. At the present time, we have several more junior officers from other components who could be recruited for the project to fill out the remainder of the team. There is no one on the horizon, however, who looks like he could take on the senior slot. Thus, the hurdle at this point to get this project started is to find the senior man.

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